







1.	 In	 his	 influential	 essay	 Freud,	 Morelli,	 and	 Sherlock	 Holmes	 the	 historian	 Carlo	
Ginzburg	relates	Freudian	psychoanalysis	 to	a	cultural	paradigm	that	he	regards	as,	on	
the	one	hand,	an	anthropological	invariant	–	think	of	λέγειν,	«reading»	in	ancient	Greek	
as	collecting	and	assembling	 things	–	but	 that,	on	 the	other	hand,	 reaches	 full	 fruition	
only	in	the	course	of	the	late	eighteenth	and	nineteenth	century	(Ginzburg	[1980]).	This	
«symptomatic	 or	 divinatory	 paradigm»	 links	 the	 reconstruction	 of	 a	 lost	 past	 to	 the	
reading	of	traces	or	symptoms	this	past	has	left	behind.	In	the	following	text	I	will	try	to	
examine	 the	 specific	 form	 the	 symptomatic	 paradigm	 has	 taken	 in	 Freudian	
psychoanalysis.	«Past»	here	means	the	past	of	a	traumatic	event	or	of	repressed	sexual	
phantasies	 from	early	 childhood	 that	 can	 no	 longer	 be	 remembered	 by	 the	 individual	
and	 have	 passed	 into	 a	 radical	 oblivion	 Freud	 calls	 «the	 unconscious».	 In	 Freud’s	
account,	«traces»	are	the	various	neurotic	symptoms,	distorted	effects	of	the	repressed	
material	 that	 keep	 on	 haunting	 the	 patient.	 The	 metaphor	 of	 «reading»	 is	 crucial	 in	
psychoanalysis,	for	it	has	methodological	consequences.	In	order	to	read,	there	must	be	
a	text.	So	the	material	for	psychoanalytical	 interpretation	has	to	be	understood,	has	to	
be	 formatted	as	 text	 in	 the	 first	 place.	 Thus,	 in	 Freudian	psychoanalysis,	 both	dreams	
and	 the	 repressed	 visual	 images	 from	 the	 past	 dreams	make	 use	 of,	 are	 regarded	 as	
camouflaged	arguments	and	propositions.	The	form	of	perceptual	impressions	is	merely	
the	 outer	 guise	 of	 an	 underlying	 syntactical	 structure	 which	 has	 come	 to	 mimic	 the	
appearance	 and	 the	 contingencies	 of	 the	 empirical	 world	 in	 order	 to	 dissimulate	 the	






But	 let	 us	 start	 with	 a	 slightly	 different	 type	 of	 unconscious	material:	 Freud’s	On	 the	
Psychopathology	 of	 Everyday	 Life.	 This	 study	 from	 1901	 introduces	 a	 taxonomy	 of	
parapraxes	 or	 «Fehlleistungen»,	 everyday	 errors	 in	 speaking,	 writing,	 remembering,	
performing	actions	or	–	reading.	According	to	Freud,	these	errors	attest	to	a	repressed,	
unconscious	 element	 in	 the	 neurotic’s	 mind	 that	 shows	 itself	 only	 negatively	 in	 the	
disturbance	 of	 an	 otherwise	 familiar	 cognitive	 or	 practical	 performance.	 Errors	 of	
speaking	 or	 «slips	 of	 the	 tongue»	 are	 the	most	 common	ones,	 but	 Freud	 also	 gives	 a	
wide	 range	 of	 examples	 of	misreadings.	 Let	me	 quote	 one	 of	 these,	 drawing	 –	 as	 so	
often	in	his	writings	around	1900	–	from	Freud’s	own	personal	experience:	




It	 not	 only	 betrays	 the	 spirit	 of	 Freud	 the	 avid	 collector	 of	 antique	 statuettes	 and	
figurines,	 but	 also	 the	 spirit	 of	 Freud	 the	 psychoanalyst,	 who	 used	 to	 compare	 the	
unconscious	with	the	ruins	of	ancient	Rome	and	the	work	of	the	psychoanalyst	with	that	
of	 an	 archeologist	 digging	 through	 the	 various	 strata	 of	 an	 excavation	 site	 to	 finally	
uncover	 a	 repressed	 desire	 or	 a	 traumatic	 memory	 that	 serves	 to	 explain	 the	 often	
confusing	array	of	 symptoms	 the	patient	 shows	on	 the	outside.	But	what	 is	more,	 the	
very	method	of	Freud’s	psychoanalytical	excavation	work	is	that	of	a	misreading,	as	I	will	




gaze,	 that	 can	be	observed	and	 recorded,	even	photographed,	as	 Jean-Martin	Charcot	
famously	 did	 in	 his	 clinic	 (see	 Didi-Huberman	 [2003]).	 In	 his	 landmark	 study	 The	
Interpretation	 of	 Dreams,	 published	 in	 1899,	 Freud	 famously	 extends	 the	 concept	 of	
















return	as	 thoughts.	Hysterical	 patients,	who	are	as	 a	 rule	of	 a	«visual»	 type,	do	not	make	
such	difficulties	for	the	analyst	as	those	with	obsessions.	Once	a	picture	has	emerged	from	




dreams	 as	 they	 are	 experienced	 or	 «hallucinated»	 by	 the	 dreamer,	 but	 their	
transpositions	into	language.	The	verbal	dream	reports	however	are	characterized	by	a	
certain	 instability.	 They	 may	 change	 every	 time	 they	 are	 narrated.	 They	 may	 be	
forgotten	or	misremembered	by	the	analyst	or	by	the	patient.	To	constitute	the	basis	of	
a	systematic	 interpretation,	as	 it	 is	undertaken	 in	a	published	case	study,	 for	example,	
the	 verbal	 discourse	 has	 to	 be	 stabilized,	 has	 to	 be	 brought	 into	 a	 constant,	 canonic	
form	–	a	 form	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 which	 every	 new	 version	 of	 a	 dream	 report	 may	 be	
identified	 as	 a	 variant	 and	 ever	 so	 small	 differences	 may	 be	 tracked	 down	 and	 –	 be	
interpreted.	 This	 is	 achieved	 by	 having	 the	 patient	 to	 write	 down	 the	 report	 of	 a	
significant	 dream	 word	 by	 word:	 «As	 regards	 texts	 of	 dreams	 to	 which	 I	 attach	
importance,	I	get	the	patient	to	conserve	them	in	written	form	after	the	narration	of	the	
dream»,	 Freud	 says	 in	 the	 Recommendations	 to	 Physicians	 Practicing	 Psycho-Analysis	
(Freud	[1912]:	113;	translation	adapted	by	the	author).	
Thus	 a	 so-called	 «dream	 text»	 is	 constituted,	 every	 word,	 every	 letter,	 every	
punctuation	mark	of	which	might	have	a	hermeneutic	significance	for	the	analyst,	that	
is,	may	be	regarded	as	a	symptom.	The	importance	Freud	attaches	to	the	production	of	
a	 stable,	 canonic	dream	 text	 can	be	 seen	 from	his	practice	of	 cutting	out	dream	 texts	
from	his	own	publications	and	pasting	them	into	his	developing	manuscripts,	should	he	
need	them	in	the	course	of	an	argument.	This	can	be	exemplified	by	two	pages	form	the	








«reads»	 them.	 The	 psychoanalytic	 interpretation	 of	 dreams	 amounts	 to	 an	 art	 of	
reading,	 a	 reading,	 however,	 that	 reads	 between	 the	 lines,	 that	 does	 not	 take	 the	
written	dream	text	at	face	value.	Rather,	it	regards	the	dream	text	as	the	distorted	form	
of	another,	unconscious	text	that	has	been	censored	by	acts	of	repression	and	disfigured	
by	various	mechanisms	of	defense.	 It	 is	this	 fundamental,	unconscious	text	that	has	to	
be	 rebuilt	 and	 reconstructed.	 The	 dream	 text	 on	 the	 other	 hand	 is	 treated	 by	 the	
psychoanalyst	as	 if	 it	was	the	result	of	a	parapraxis,	the	product	of	a	series	of	neurotic	
miswritings,	which	can	only	be	undone	by	a	careful	analytical	«misreading»,	so	to	speak.	
Systematically	 misreading	 this	 text	 is	 to	 treat	 its	 specific	 organization	 as	 a	 form	 of	
falsehood,	 as	 a	 mere	 and	 incomplete	 mimicry	 of	 grammatical	 and	 syntactical	
correctness	expressing	a	chain	of	causal	events	in	its	rightful	sequence	–	Freud	calls	this	












translation.	 It	 may	 also	 serve	 to	 illustrate	 the	 functioning	 of	 a	 specific	 mechanism	 of	
defense	–	«condensation»	–	which	attaches	different	meanings	or	signifieds	to	one	and	
the	 same	 signifier.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 example	 shows	 how	 the	 psychological	
mechanisms	of	defense	may	operate	via	a	mimicry	of	direct	visual	perception,	whereas	
in	 truth	 the	experienced	optical	 impression	 is	 just	a	 sensorial	effect	of	an	unconscious	
machinery	of	desire	working	according	to	the	 laws	of	a	 language.	To	put	 it	 in	Lacanian	
terms:	This	machinery	is	driven	by	a	fundamental	lack	of	the	signified.	
The	Wolf	Man	used	to	be	one	of	Freud’s	patients.	A	Russian	nobleman	from	Odessa,	
Sergius	 Pankejeff,	 as	 he	 was	 legally	 known,	 was	 in	 Freud’s	 treatment	 in	 Vienna	 from	
1910	 to	 1914.	 Freud’s	 most	 important	 case	 study	 –	 From	 the	 History	 of	 an	 Infantile	
Neurosis,	published	in	1918	–	is	dedicated	to	him.	In	the	eighth	chapter	a	dream	of	the	
Wolf	Man	is	recounted:	«‹I	had	a	dream»,	he	said,	«of	a	man	tearing	off	the	wings	of	a	









In	 the	 Studies	 on	 Hysteria,	 published	 four	 years	 earlier	 than	 the	 Interpretation	 of	
Dreams,	Freud	compares	the	complex	of	repressed	thoughts,	fantasies	and	imaginations	












As	a	good	 librarian	or	archivist,	 the	psychoanalyst	has	to	read	through	all	 the	files	and	
their	various	papers	to	arrive	at	the	last,	the	fundamental	text	that	spells	out	the	core	of	
the	neurosis	explaining	its	genesis	and	its	particular	guise	in	the	patient	at	hand.	
3.	 Let	us	now	come	back	 to	 the	dream	 images	as	 the	dreamer	experiences	 them.	We	
have	already	stated	that	Freud	characterizes	them	as	hallucinated	perceptual	images.	In	
the	 sixth	 chapter	 of	 the	 Interpretation	 of	 Dreams,	 however,	 he	 takes	 a	 different	
approach	 and	 advices	 his	 readers	 to	 regard	 them	 as	 already	 containing	 within	
themselves	 a	 textual	 constituent,	 that	 is,	 to	 regard	 them	 as	 rebuses.	 As	 is	 known,	
rebuses	are	printed	or	drawn	riddles	that	contain	both	pictures	and	snippets	of	text.	The	
letter	«h»	followed	by	the	picture	of	a	human	ear,	for	instance,	may	be	resolved	as	«to	
hear,	 to	 listen»,	 but	 equally	 as	 the	 adverbial	 «here»,	 indicating	 «this	 place	 here».	
Orthographical	 correctness	 is	 not	 a	 factor	 in	 rebuses,	 on	 the	 contrary,	 typically	 they	
require	creative	misreading	to	be	solved	at	all.	
Changing	 the	 status	 of	 dreams	 from	 hallucinated	 perceptions	 to	 rebuses	 is	 a	 far-
reaching	 decision.	 How	 can	 we	 account	 for	 it?	 Well,	 we	 should	 take	 it	 in	 formal,	
methodological	 terms	 rather	 than	 in	 ontological	 ones.	 It	 seems	 to	me,	 that	 this	move	
brings	 to	 light	a	 fundamental	 Freudian	bias,	namely	 that	 interpretation	 in	general	 and	
psychoanalytic	 interpretation	 in	 particular	 can	 only	 be	 the	 interpretation	 of	 texts,	 can	
only	be	achieved	through	modes	of	reading,	rather	than	modes	of	looking.	
So	 if	 you	 are	 dealing	 with	 images	 or	 pictures	 –	 as	 psychoanalysis	 does	 or	 as	 art	
history	 does	 –	 you	 have	 to	 stop	 treating	 them	 as	 «dense»	 systems	 –	 to	 use	 Nelson	
Goodman’s	 term	 –,	 each	 and	 every	 visual	 aspect	 of	 which	 can	 be	 a	 bearer	 of	
significance.	 Rather,	 you	 have	 to	 treat	 them	 as	 discrete	 or	 «digital»	 systems	 that	 are	
composed	of	certain	finite	and	separate	elements	combined	according	to	a	set	of	rules	
or	«grammar»3.	In	short,	you	have	to	treat	the	images	as	texts	or,	at	least,	as	analogous	
to	texts,	 in	order	to	be	able	to	read	them	correctly,	or	to	 interpret	them	at	all.	 In	that	
regard,	both	the	concept	of	the	dream	images	as	rebuses	and	the	notion	of	the	dream	
text	 as	 the	 stabilized,	 quotable,	 repeatable	 result	 of	 an	 ekphrasis	 are	 indispensable	









of	 perception	 that	 hardly	 conceals	 the	 mechanism	 of	 its	 own	 making,	 incorporating	
pictorial	and	linguistic	elements	alike.	
To	 try	 to	 interpret	 dream	 images	 qua	 images,	 to	 treat	 them	 as	 «pictorial	
compositions»,	 not	 to	 convert	 them	 into	 text	 has	 been	 the	 major	 error	 of	 his	
predecessors,	 Freud	 says.	 They	 all	 fell	 for	 their	 mimetic	 function,	 so	 to	 speak,	 taking	
their	visual	form	at	face	value.	Here	is	a	quote	from	The	Interpretation	of	Dreams,	from	
the	beginning	of	chapter	six:	
But	obviously	we	 can	only	 form	a	proper	 judgment	of	 the	 rebus	 if	we	put	 aside	 criticisms	
such	as	these	of	the	whole	composition	and	its	parts	and	if,	instead,	we	try	to	replace	each	
separate	 element	 by	 a	 syllable	 or	word	 that	 can	be	 represented	by	 that	 element	 in	 some	
way	or	other.	The	words	which	are	put	 together	 in	 this	way	are	no	 longer	nonsensical	but	













visual	 images	 in	 the	 act	 of	 dreaming.	 These	 perceptual	 images	 somewhat	 distort	 the	
underlying	 text	 submitting	 it	 to	 characteristic	 transformations,	 partly	 because	 of	 the	
censorship	 of	 repression,	 partly	 because	 the	 «means	 of	 representation»	 or	
«Darstellungsmittel»	 are	 different	 in	 images	 and	 in	 texts,	 as	 Freud	 notes.	 During	 the	
analytical	session	the	patient	translates	the	perceptual	images	that	made	up	his	dream	















directly	 by	 the	 therapist,	 but	 can	only	 be	 inferred	 from	 symptoms.	 That	 is	why,	 Freud	
himself	 occasionally	 uses	 the	 apter	 term	 «construction»	 instead	 of	 «reconstruction»	
when	talking	about	the	unconscious	«text»	of	the	dream-thoughts.	From	this	does	not	
follow,	 however,	 that	 Freud’s	metaphors	 of	 «reading»	 are	 just	made	 up	 or	 arbitrarily	
used.	 They	 have	 practical	 consequences,	 as	 they	 structure	 the	 whole	 enterprise	 of	
psychoanalysis	 both	 as	 a	 cure	 and	 as	 a	 science.	 They	 serve	 to	 establish	 a	 consistent	
model	of	the	specific	past	linked	to	the	unconscious,	a	model	that	helps	to	explain	both	
the	 genesis	 and	 actual	 form	 of	 a	 patient’s	 symptoms	 and	 set	 the	 conditions	 for	 their	
removal.	
4.	 I	 would	 like	 to	 end	 this	 article	 with	 a	
sidestep	 to	 Freud’s	 aesthetics	 and	 turn	
attention	 to	 his	 essay	 The	 Moses	 of	
Michelangelo.	 The	 title	 refers	 to	 a	 marble	
statue	 the	 artist	 conceived	 for	 the	
monumental	grave	of	Pope	Julius	II	(Fig.	2).	
It	was	sculpted	around	1514	and	is	situated	
in	 the	 church	 of	 San	 Pietro	 in	 Vincoli	 in	
Rome.	This	statue	had	elicited	a	wide	range	
of	 art	 historical	 interpretations,	 none	 of	
which	 seemed	 convincing	 to	 Freud,	 when	
he	set	about	 to	write	his	own	essay,	which	
was	 published	 anonymously	 in	 the	 journal	
Imago	 in	 19144.	 What	 struck	 Freud	 about	
the	 statue	 were	 two	 things:	 first,	 the	
position	 of	 Moses’	 right	 hand	 that	 is	
curiously	 involved	 with	 various	 streaks	 of	







The	 method	 Freud	 uses	 to	 analyze	 the	 statue	 bears	 remarkable	 similarities	 to	 his	
hermeneutic	 «reading»	 of	 dream	 images.	 As	 with	 the	 dream	 images,	 the	 amateur	 art	
historian	 Freud	 tries	 to	 regard	 the	 statue	 as	 a	 text,	 made	 up	 of	 significant	 traces	 or	
symptoms	whose	careful	reading	allows	for	a	correct	 interpretation	of	the	artwork.	Two	
main	features	in	the	essay	attest	to	this:	On	the	one	hand,	Freud	does	not	seem	to	look	at	
the	 statue	 itself,	 but	 rather	he	 seems	 to	 look	at	 it	 through	 the	 lens	of	 the	art	historical	
literature	 that	 has	 been	written	 about	 it	 up	 to	 his	 day.	Most	 of	 the	 essay	 consists	 in	 a	
compilation,	 comparison	 and	 an	 almost	 philological	 reading	 of	 these	 accounts.	 It	 is	
through	the	method	of	comparative	 reading	–	and,	 in	a	way,	creative	misreading	–	 that	




of	 this	 «method	 of	 details».	 Under	 the	 pseudonym	 of	 Ivan	 Lermolieff,	 Morelli	 had	
demonstrated	 in	 the	 second	 half	 of	 the	 nineteenth	 century	 that	 the	 attribution	 of	
paintings	 to	 certain	 painters	 can	 be	 effectuated	 by	 paying	 attention	 not	 to	 the	whole	
picture,	but	to	the	way	minor	details	are	painted.	According	to	Morelli,	attention	should	
be	 diverted	 from	 the	 general	 impression	 and	main	 characteristics	 of	 a	 picture,	 laying	
stress	instead	on	minor	features,	like	the	specific	drawing	of	a	fingernail,	of	an	earlobe,	
of	 halos	 and	 such	 unconsidered	 trifles	 which	 the	 copyist	 neglects	 to	 imitate	 and	 yet	
which	every	artist	executes	in	his	own	characteristic	way	(see	Freud	[1914b]:	222).	
As	 in	 Freud’s	 own	 technique	 of	 interpreting	 dream	 images,	 the	 pictures	 are	
discomposed	by	Morelli	and	broken	up	into	a	set	of	signs,	of	symptoms,	of	indexes.	But	
how	 does	 Freud	 read	Michelangelo’s	 statue	 then?	 He	 reads	 it	 as	 an	 allegory	 of	 self-
restraint,	 of	 mastering	 one’s	 violent	 temper.	 Freud	 explains	 the	 current	 form	 of	 the	
statue	as	 the	 result	of	 an	agitated	movement,	which	 for	 the	 spectator	 lies	 in	 the	past	
and	 cannot	 be	 perceived	 directly.	 A	 movement	 that	 would	 have	 resulted	 in	 the	
destruction	of	the	Tables	of	the	Law	had	the	prophet	not	composed	himself.	In	Freud’s	
interpretation,	 the	Moses	 of	Michelangelo	 differs	 significantly	 from	 its	 biblical	model,	
who	gets	angry	at	 the	 sight	of	 the	golden	calf	 after	descending	 from	Mount	Sinai	 and	
smashes	the	Tables	of	the	Law	the	Lord	has	dictated	him.	
Four	drawings	were	published	together	with	Freud’s	essay	(Fig.	3-5).	Freud	had	them	












What	 is	 interesting	 –	 and	 somewhat	 singular	 in	 Freud’s	 oeuvre	 –	 is	 the	 specific	
reconstruction	of	a	past	 through	 images,	 and	not	 through	a	 text.	But	do	 the	drawings	
really	stand	for	themselves?	Are	they	not	simple	illustrations,	carried	out	under	Freud’s	
direction,	 according	 to	his	«script»,	 so	 to	 speak?	Do	 they	 really	«show»	movement	or	
are	they	just	there	to	indicate	certain	positions	–	of	the	right	hand,	of	the	Tables	of	the	
Law	–	 and	 the	 changes	 in	 these	positions?	 The	answer	 is	 all	 too	 clear,	 as	my	 chain	of	
questions	has	been	rhetorical.	The	drawings	decompose	Michelangelo’s	statue,	isolate	it	
from	its	context,	remove	it	from	the	play	of	light	and	color	inside	the	church,	fix	its	visual	
appearance	to	 just	one	single	point	of	view.	They	reduce	 it	 to	the	status	of	a	diagram.	






basic	 diagrammatic	 structure.	 Even	 though	 they	 are	 about	 the	 speculative	
reconstruction	of	a	highly	affective	bodily	movement,	in	these	graphics	time	has	ceased	
to	exist.	In	them,	psychoanalytical	interpretation	seems	to	have	absorbed	a	defining	trait	




















Washington:	 Library	of	Congress,	 Sigmund	Freud	Papers,	Box	OV	7,	page	24.	 Source:	
Library	of	Congress.	
Figure	1b:	Sigmund	Freud:	«Aus	der	Geschichte	einer	 infantilen	Neurose»,	manuscript,	
Washington:	 Library	of	Congress,	 Sigmund	Freud	Papers,	Box	OV	7,	page	25.	 Source:	
Library	of	Congress.	
Figure	 2:	 Michelangelo:	Moses,	 ca.	 1513-15,	 statue	 from	 the	 tomb	 of	 Pope	 Julius	 II,	
marble,	Rome:	Basilica	di	San	Pietro	in	Vincoli.	Source:	Sigmund	Freud:	«Der	Moses	des	
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